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Abstract
Law-like generalisations hedged with a ceteris paribus-clause such as  widely in use in 
psychology, the social and biological sciences, are best construed as incomplete strict 
laws. These incomplete laws can be “fleshed out” by adding a set of enabling, or 
completing, conditions  to their antecedent. In other words, the logical form of a cp-
law, ceteris paribus ∀x (A -> B), is ∀x (A & CB -> B). The nature of CB must be subject 
to non-ad hoc constraints, however, failing which all putative ceteris paribus-
generalisations  will be trivially true. Two simple and plausible constraints are that: (i) 
A and CB be jointly sufficient for the consequent of the law, and (ii) the relevant 
completer also occur in the antecedents of other laws-in other words, that there be 
many other law-like generalisations of the form ∀x (D& CB -> E), ∀x (F & CB -> E), 
etc. Apparent counterexamples  to this  proposal can be disarmed by interpreting the 
epistemology of cp-laws as a curve-fitting problem, which consists in determining the 
relevant nomic regularity and plotting the correct curve over a very noisy data-set 
that contains large numbers of outliers and anomalies. The process  of specifying the 
content of the ceteris paribus-clause that is  hedging a law-candidate is  in fact isomor-
phic with the process of determining which parts  of one's  data  are outlying and 
anomalous, and which are part of the regularity. I submit that statistical theorems 
such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) are instrumental in the latter process, 
and therefore also in the former. AIC states that a law-hypothesis which minimises 
both the number of adjustable parameters  and error variance (i.e. a hypothesis  that 
achieves  an optimal balance between simplicity and adequacy to the data), displays 
the highest estimated accuracy of prediction of future data from the same distribu-
tion. I go on to discuss  how AIC in combination with conditions (i) and (ii) illustrates 
the fundamental difference between a ceteris paribus-law and a statistical law, and how 
it yields  the distinction between spurious and genuine hedged regularities that is  nec-
essary to make cp-laws  “respectable”. Thus, I show how popular putative problem 
cases, such as “turtles live long lives” or “U.S. Supreme Court Justices  are male” can 
be dealt with by the theory. Finally, I utilise work by Lange 2000; 2002 to deflect the 
criticism that cp-laws are, by their very nature incompletable, and hence indetermi-
nate. I close by concluding that the account provides  a very simple, powerful, and yet 
metaphysically conservative account of  ceteris paribus-laws. 
Introduction
Ceteris Paribus-generalisations are hedged, or qualified, generalisations of the form „all 
Fs are Gs, everything else being equal.“ They are a familiar feature of economics, 
where they were first widely used in the 19th century, as for example in the claim that 
“everything else being equal, the rate of wage varies with the supply of labour”; but 
they are of course a mainstay of most of the other sciences as well, with varying locu-
tions serving as the hedging clause. Thus, we find generalisations such as 
•‘normally, officers in the 18th-century British Navy were aristocrats,’
• ‘if  nothing interferes, planets travel in elliptical orbits,’
• ‘ideally, the pressure (P) of a gas in a container varies with the tempera-
ture (T), volume (V), or number of gas molecules (N) according to the 
equation P = nRT/V.’ 1 
But hedged generalisations also permeate everyday life: if I have been reliably told—
say, by a good friend—that, ‘usually, Paul is in the Pub on Friday nights,’ then this 
knowledge together with the fact that it is Friday night is likely to make me believe that 
Paul is now in the Pub, all other things being usual: 
• ‘usually, Paul is in the pub on Friday nights’
Manifestly we use hedged generalisations on a daily basis to summarise, explain, and to 
predict events, although we do not in every context explicitly indicate that they are 
saddled with a proviso of  some sort. 
Their ubiquity and their epistemic significance naturally raises the question whether 
some hedged generalisations could be considered laws of nature. Laws are, after all, 
what we also sometimes invoke when we summarise, predict and explain events, and 
they are what the sciences are widely believed to discover. If we took a traditional Hu-
mean view of a law of nature as a strict but contingent regularity between property 
instantiations F and G, expressed in a universal conditional, ∀x (Fx → Gx), then ceteris 
paribus-laws would simply be non-strict laws that allow exceptional instances of an x 
being F and not being G, on the condition that in those instances the circumstances 
denoted by the expression ‘all other things being equal’, ‘normal’, ‘ideal’, etc. We could 
express this idea provisionally by prefixing our law with a cp-operator: 
1 The second and third generalisations are stock examples of  purported ceteris paribus-laws; the first is 
due to Lange 2002.
 cp (∀x (Fx → Gx))
One of the advantages of admitting such a type of law would be that this would yield 
a simple and immediate explanation of the manifest cognitive and epistemic signifi-
cance of many hedged generalisations. A second, and perhaps more important advan-
tage would be the immediate vindication of the status of the special sciences, which 
discover few if  any strict regularities in their respective domains. 
The question is of course whether the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. The 
problems with the notion of a cp-law are said to be numerous, but can ultimately be 
reduced to two main problems with the very notion of  a ceteris paribus-law: 
(1) the exact meaning of the ceteris paribus-clause and thus its  contribution to 
the truth conditions of a hypothesis is unclear—we have no semantics for 
cp-laws. 
(2) ceteris paribusceteris paribusceteris paribus-clauses seem to render hypotheses 
untestable—we have no methodology for the testing and confirmation of 
cp-laws.
There have been numerous proposals that attempt, in very different ways, to overcome 
the “no semantics” and the “no methodology” objections, and equally numerous the 
rebuttals and refutations of those proposals.2 I cannot look at any of these in any detail 
in the space I have here. Rather I shall present my own proposal, and illustrate how I 
think it solves some of the problems and counterexamples that have dogged previous 
accounts. 
A completer-account
My proposal is what Woodward 2002 calls a “completer”-account. The general argu-
ment strategy is a tried-and-tested one (and a “hopelessly misguided” one, according to 
Woodward...). This is to first is  assume as unproblematic strict laws of nature for a given 
2 Pro cp-laws: Cartwright 1983, Hausman 1988, Hausman 1992, Kincaid 1990, Fodor 1991, Lange 
1993 Lange 2002, Pietroski and Rey 1995, Lipton 1999, Morreau 1999, Schurz 2002, Glymour 2002, 
Spohn 2002; contra cp-laws: Giere 1988, Schiffer 1991, Schurz 2001, Mott 1992, Weinert 1997, Ear-
man and Roberts 1999, Earman, Roberts et al. 2002, Woodward 2000, Woodward 2002, Mitchell 
2002, Smith 2002.
domain in the form of universally quantified conditionals3, and then to claim that ce-
teris paribus-laws are simply incomplete strict laws of the domain—with the cp-clause 
denoting the missing completing condition(s) of the law. Thus, the cp-clause is nothing 
but a placeholder for the missing completion, and cp-laws will be legitimate to the ex-
tent that their ceteris paribus clauses can be connected in some systematic way with the 
underlying strict laws in the domain. Hence our condition (1):
cp ∀x ((Fx → Gx) if
(1) ∀ x ((Fx & Cx) → Gx) 
The idea here is that every exception to “All Fs are Gs”, i.e. an x that is F but not G, 
will be due to the absence of the completer C. Now, this has of course been tried be-
fore (cf. E.g. Fodor 1991, Hausman 1988, 1992, Pietroski and Rey 1995), and it didn’t 
work. In a nutshell,4 the problem is that ∀x (Fx & Cx → Gx) as it stands is  trivially true 
if the completing condition C is not qualified in just the right way. For example, on the 
interpretation:
Fx: x is spherical
Gx: x is conductive,
Cx: x is made of  copper
the obviously spurios “ceteris paribus, all spherical bodies are conductors” will turn out 
true, because ∀x (Fx & Cx) → Gx)) is strictly true. (Earman and Roberts 2002). In fact, 
it seems as for non-probabilistic laws, for any G, some condition C will always be suffi-
cient. Note however that all the work in counterexamples of this type (of which there 
are indefinitely many) is done by the completer Cx, which is sufficient by itself for elec-
trical conductivity. Hence, a good second constraint on the account seems to be Fodor’s 
(Fodor 1995): neither F nor C can be nomically sufficient by itself for G, but must jointly 
be so. 
(2) neither F nor C is nomically sufficient by itself  for G. 
3 I am assuming here, for the purposes of  this argument, that these conditionals have “nomic force”,  
in other words they are more than accidental generalizations, and that their antecedents state nomi-
cally sufficient conditions for their consequent. In other words, I intend to focus on the specific nature 
of  the contribution of  the cp-clause to a law-statement, by helping myself  to the notion of  a strict law, 
and by presupposing that we have some general understanding lawlikeness. Divide and conquer is cer-
tainly the right strategy in this field, and it is rather disingenuous to charge defenders of  cp-laws with 
the additional tasks of  also providing a theory of  law-likeness and/or confirmation in one fell swoop. 
4 The problems with this approach are scrutinized in detail in the literature (Schiffer, Earman and 
Roberts, Spohn, Mott, among others), parts of  which Woodward briefly surveys.
This should be uncontentious: if either of the conjuncts in the antecedent is nomically 
sufficient on its own, the other conjunct will be idle, and can be left out of  the law.
Yet, this has, again, been shown to be not nearly enough by a barrage of critics, who 
have found further counterexamples of spurious generalisations that seem to pass the 
test:
“ceteris paribus, thirsty human beings will eat salt” (Mott) 
‘ceteris paribus, all charged objects accelerate at 10 m/s2’. (Woodward)
Many of the critics of cp-laws have since considered the case closed, and the 
completer-account of cp-laws as incomplete strict laws, to be fundamentally wrong-
headed (Woodward 2002). This is, I believe, too hasty. 
A curve-fitting supplement
I suggest we keep our first two conditions, and add two conditions to the account: 
cp ∀x (Fx → Gx) if
(1) ∀x ((Fx & Cx) → Gx)
(2) neither F nor C is nomically sufficient by itself  for G
+
(3) C occurs in the antecedents of  other laws 
(4) If both a hypothesis and its contrary satisfy (1)-(3), then we must chose the one that 
minimizes error variance, while maximizing closeness of fit to the observational data 
and simplicity (Akaike Information Criterion)
Motivation for condition (3):
The reasons for invoking (3) are quite straightforward. Candidate cp-laws and their 
corresponding completers clearly need to be vouched for in order to avoid spurious counter-
examples, as we have seen. This is the specific problem of any theory of cp-laws: cp-laws 
are in danger of vacuity, as Pietroski and Rey put it, and most accounts of hedged 
generalisations must play a game of “avoid the counterexamples”. We have seen so far 
that too much latitude in what we allow Cx to be results in easily reproducible 
nonsense. For example, on the present account, we might just as well claim that “ceteris 
paribus, turtles outrun hares” (Boghossian). After all, on an interpretation of Cx, which 
includes either 
· divine intervention
· “ideal” conditions for turtles such that turtles have much stronger hearts, more 
flexible joints, longer legs, ...
 
we could indeed justify that claim that if Cx, then tortoises could run faster than hares. 
We need to restrict the range of conditions to the realm of the scientifically accessible, 
and a quick and efficient to do this is  to require that Cx figure in the antecedents of 
other scientific laws. Hereby, we ensure that the purported completing condition have 
some scientific standing, and we encode the natural assumption that it ought always to 
be established science that decides what legitimate ceteris paribus-laws are. In other 
words, condition (3) provides a demarcation criterion for cp-laws from pseudo-science 
and plain nonsense.  I am going to call completers of the „divine intervention“-type 
just completers, and completers that satisfy (3) and figure in existing laws, „nomological 
completers“.
Condition (3) amounts to a boot-strapping method similar to one first proposed by Fo-
dor 1991 for ceteris paribus-laws: candidate cp-laws and their relevant completers are 
vouched for here via a boot-strapping procedure whereby a cp-generalisation derives 
its nomic status relative to a background theory that already includes other cp-laws. (3), 
incidentally, also gives shape to the notion that nature’s regularities ‘cut across each 
other’ and that we will always need to understand the (second-order) regularities that 
govern a given completer in order to understand why some of nature’s regularities 
sometimes fail to hold in a given case.
Let’s take a look at how (3) works in an actual example, where it distinguishes between 
a merely descriptive summary of a uniformity in events or behaviour, from a genuine 
ceteris paribus law. Take the generalisation:
“ceteris paribus U.S. Supreme Court Justices are male’
I claim that this is  not a proper sociological cp-law, because it is neither a strict law 
(there have been 2 females to date), nor does it seem to satisfy condition (3): it is not the 
case that for every exception (the appointment of a female justice) there is a nomological 
completer whose absence would account for the exception to the law in that particular 
case. There is no (lawful, nomological) Cx here, because there are presumably no sta-
ble and systematically reoccurring conditions under which male candidates will neces-
sarily be preferred over females ones, and there are no such conditions that figure in 
other sociological laws.  Hence it is not a legitimate law.
Now, this last claim might very well be challenged. Perhaps this is a false analysis, and 
that is exactly the point here: the question whether or not there are any nomological 
completers to a given generalisation must always be one for empirical research. So, if it 
turned out that the correct socio-political analysis of the appointment process implies 
that there are in fact systematically reoccurring, non-accidental, conditions under 
which men are, against the injunctions of the U.S. Constitution, systematically 
preferred over women, and if these conditions are theoretically promiscuous—in other 
words, if they also occur in other sociological laws governing, say, the election of 
Presidents, the appointment of Attorney Generals or Cabinet members, etc.,—then we 
would might have to take a second look and reconsider whether the law is not, 
perhaps, after all a genuine cp-law in political science.
Motivation for  condition (4) :
So far so good, but (3) on its own is still not enough.5  The problem, as it has turned 
out, is that by the lights of conditions (1)-(3) there will still be a rather large set of 
legitimate, nomological, completers, so large in fact that we can legitimize both a given 
hedged generalisation, and its contrary:
“It’ll fly, ceteris paribus”          <->     “it won’t fly, ceteris paribus”
Or, to take an example closer to scientific practice: 
Ceteris Paribus, nuts are healthy      <->   ceteris paribus, nuts are lethal
Here we have a case where both a scientifically acceptable hypothesis A and its con-
trary seem to have a legitimate completer. Nuts are healthy: nuts have, notwithstanding 
their high fat content, been discovered to carry many health benefits, in particular that 
of being cardio-protective, So it is a roughly true generalisation of clinical nutrition 
that (regular) nut consumption creates positive health outcomes. Yet, evidently, there 
are numerous counter-instances to this “law”, people with a specific allergy, N, who do 
experience severe and sometimes fatal anaphylactic reactions due to ingestion of  nuts. 
5 Something analogous has been tried before (cf. for example Fodor 1991 and Pietroski and Rey  1995).
A sceptic can thus make the rather gratuitous claim that ‘ingestion of nuts → death’ is 
a true nomic regularity. It is just that this “law” is being “interfered” with by the more 
or less permanent absence in large parts of the population of a nuts allergy. Such a 
rogue “law” would predict that every consumption of nuts is followed by death and 
explain away the vast number of exceptions with the fact that in all those cases the 
necessary completer, absence of the allergy, happened to be not instantiated. We can 
see that the completer invoked here, possession of the allergy N, would be legitimate 
according to conditions (1) -(3), for not only is  ‘(x eats nuts & x has N → x dies)’ true, 
the allergy by itself is not sufficient for death, and we can expect there to be many 
other laws governing other regularities in the behaviour and properties of individuals 
having N.6 
The most fruitful reply to this sort of counterexample is, I believe, to deploy a curve-
fitting analysis. For the evidential reasoning of someone who on the basis of a given set 
of data seriously entertains the hypothesis that ‘cp (x eats nuts → x dies)’ must differ 
markedly from the reasoning of someone who on the basis of the same data comes to 
the contrary conclusion that ‘cp (x eats nuts → x experiences health benefits).’ An ob-
server who accepts the latter is making sense of the evidence in a different way, a way 
we should try to make explicit and subject to objective scrutiny. Our relevant evidence 
is as follows: millions of people eat nuts every day, and with very few exceptions no ad-
verse health effects  are observed. In other words, we dispose of the set of data {Fa1 & 
Ga1, Fa2 & Ga2, ... Fan & Gan}, where F and G express the properties ‘has eaten nuts’ 
and ‘experiences health benefits’, respectively, a ranges over human beings, and n is 
fairly large. We can display this evidence in a scatter graph, by taking instances of nut 
ingestion at specific times as our independent variable, and differential impact on 
health as our dependent one, as follows:
6 In reality, the mere consumption of  nuts together with possession of  a nuts allergy is (fortunately!) not 
strictly sufficient for death—a number of  other conditions must be fulfilled as well. But I shall ignore 
this complication here, and assume that N is indeed a fully specified completer of  the “law” ‘cp (x eats 
nuts-> x dies)’.
Figure 1.7
A very simple idea is now this: given our evidence, and in the absence of all further 
background knowledge, we should clearly say that “ceteris paribus, eating nuts is 
healthy”. In other words, we should plot the following curve
Figure 2.
7 A note on the graphs. This representation is somewhat imperfect for a number of  reasons: consump-
tion is a matter of  degree, and health effects are a matter of  time, so I should represent the number of  
nuts consumed here together with health effects over a period of  time. But I have assumed that the 
causal effect of  nut consumption on health is more or less immediate and independent on quantity to 
simplify things, allowing me to represent each consumption via a single data point, and to spare me the 
need of  representing the evidence as results of  longitudinal studies of  each individual’s health over 
time. This still leaves me with a binary variable here of  instances of  consumption of  nuts at different 
times, whereas ideally I would like to have a simple independent variable. Furthermore, although I will 
be plotting curves over the data, the curves should strictly speaking have no intercept, because at the 
intercept the value of  the independent variable is of  course 0, so that it cannot represent the causal 
influence of  nuts. Finally, I’m presupposing of  course that we actually have clear quantitative criteria 
for ‘health’ that I can put on my y-axis, and that an individual’s one-time consumption of  nuts would 
register on that scale. 
On the other hand, to say that nuts are lethal, ceteris paribus, is somewhat perverse:
Figure 3.
By framing the task of deciding between these two alternatives as a task of choosing 
between two alternative curves to plot over our data, we can complete our account of 
cp-laws. 
Let’s go back to Figure 2, and the hypothesis that ‘cp, nuts are healthy’. If differential 
impact on health and nut ingestion are the only two relevant quantities that you know 
of in this particular epistemic context—in other words, if you know nothing yet of the 
allergy—then the task of formulating a hypothesis concerning the relation between 
these two observed quantities becomes a trivial exercise of linear regression, familiar to 
all experimental scientists. In the absence of further background knowledge any ex-
perimenter would find x and y to be correlated, and the simplest mathematical model 
adequate to the data would be the hypothesis that the relation between nut consump-
tion and health effects is linear and continuous, i.e. of the form y = β1 + β2 x. So we 
calculate the coefficients of our straight line using the least squares method by mini-
mising the sum of the squares (SOS) of the vertical distances between each data point 
and our curve – and we get the straight line at y= + 0.5 (The estimate for the constant 
term β1 and slope coefficient β2 is 0.5 and 0, respectively, in other words we conclude 
that nut consumption is followed by a positive differential impact on health and that 
the size of  this impact (+0.5) remains constant over time).
Now, even if we were now to learn about allergy N, then we would not change our 
minds on which line to plot – but we would be quite satisfied that we’ve found an inter-
fering variable which can explain those very strange anomalies at the bottom of the 
graph. 
Not so our perverse curve-fitter. Learning about anomaly N, she says the following: 
let’s take the sparse points below – 0.5 to be the normal distribution of our data, and 
ignore the main bulk around + 0.5 for the calculation of the mean. In other words, 
let’s declare all data around + 0.5 anomalous. Then, apply linear regression analysis, 
and plot the regression line way down in the lower part of the graph. So the assump-
tions of the perverse curve fitter are (1) the true regularity between the observed quan-
tities is the one represented by the lower curve, ‘nuts are lethal’; (2) this regularity is not 
observed more frequently because an interfering factor, the absence of N, is perma-
nently present; (3) if the interfering factor, the absence of N, were absent -  in other 
words, if we did have a majority of people with the allergy, then the bulk of the data 
would be normally distributed around y = – 0.75. So, as things stand  now, the actually 
observed y-values of the independent variable are highly skewed towards 0.5, but that 
this is merely an artefact of conditions specifically excluded by the cp-clause of ‘cp (x 
eats nuts → x dies)’.
The moral to be drawn from this example is that cp-clauses are clearly very powerful, 
and they can be abused in order to arbitrarily turn on its head what is considered an 
exception (anomaly) and what is the norm. We hence need normative rules to con-
strain our interpretation of the evidence in favour of a given cp-law. My choice for 
such a rule is the Akaike Information Criterion.8 AIC states that:
Estimated (Distance from the truth of  family F) = SOS (L(F)) + 2σ2k + C,
where a ‘family’ of curves F is a set given by the form of the curves as it manifests itself 
in their algebraic expression (‘y = ax + b’, for example, determines the family of 
straight lines, ‘y = a + bx + cx2’ that of parabolas, etc.); ‘SOS (L(F))’ stands for the sum 
of squares of the best-fitting curve of the family of curves F; the term ‘k’ denotes the 
number of adjustable parameters of that family; ‘σ2’ represents the distribution of “er-
8 The Akaike Information Critrion (AIC) was first proposed by Akaike 1973, and introduced to a 
philosophical audience more recently by Forster and Sober 1994.  AIC, I should mention here, is con-
tentious. Curve-fitting is a hard problem not only for scientists, but also for philosophers who are inter-
ested in the epistemic justification of  the practice; not everyone believes that it is a always possible to 
justify our curve-fitting preferences. AIC is particularly unpopular with Bayesians, as it provides an al-
ternative, non-Bayesian way to justify a non-deductive, ampliative, inference. Bandyopadhyay, Boik et 
al. 1996 claim that a Bayesian curve fitting criterion, BTC, is equivalent to AIC given the right choice 
of  priors. I have no firm opinion on whether Bayesianist epistemology provides a better justification of  
curve-fitting than AIC, but this is not a debate that needs to be decided here. What I intend to do is 
instead to take known curve-fitting criteria and show how they can be usefully applied in a theory of  
cp-laws. I find that AIC yields extensionally correct results - an indirect justification of  its use here, 
granted, but a justification nevertheless. 
rors”, or anything that appears as error given the hypothesis, i.e. the influence of addi-
tional factors; and ‘C’ is a constant. 
Forster and Sober 1994 argue that AIC theorem justifies simplicity considerations in 
curve-fitting. When the best family of curves (or the best model) has been chosen ac-
cording to the criterion provided by AIC, we can determine the best-fitting curve from 
that family through the method of least squares. The strength of AIC, according to 
Forster and Sober, is that it shows how these two steps, which are usually considered to 
be separate, are related. The fewer adjustable parameters (k) a model contains, the 
fewer parameter values need to be estimated through regression techniques; the fewer 
values need to be estimated, the smaller the estimation error, and the better predictive 
accuracy. AIC thus promises to justify our general preference for simplicity (quantified 
by k) without appeal to obscure metaphysical principles or mere pragmatic conven-
ience, by reference to the data itself: AIC shows that, given the data, a hypothesis with 
fewer adjustable parameters will have the tangible effect of tending to lead to better 
predictions of  future data from the same distribution (Forster and Sober 1994: 27).
How is this theorem to be applied to our problem? Well, given a certain data set, we 
obtain a reliable estimate of the predictive accuracy of model ‘F’ by adding the term 
‘2kσ2’ to the sum-of-squares of the best-fitting curve derived from F. In other words, 
AIC tells us that in order to get the best predictively adequate hypothesis out of our 
data, we need to minimize SOS (L(F)) (distance to observed values of the dependent 
variable, σ2 (error variance, amount of fluctuation in our data around the curve), and k 
(complexity of  our curve.
In normal curve-fitting AIC compensates for potential over-fitting by penalising models 
that are too complex through the addition of a positive correction term proportional to 
their number of parameters, hence the ‘k’ in ‘2kσ2’. For our present purposes, where 
we are dealing with a choice between two straight lines the degree of complexity of 
which is identical, the decisive factor is not k  but σ. AIC penalises our perverse curve-
fitter for the error variance in the data as she interprets it. σ measures the degree to 
which the observed data tends to fluctuate around the true curve. A greater number of 
outlying points will increase its value: if nuts are indeed lethal, then most of the data 
are outliers, and the value of σ2 will in that case be very high, disqualifying the hy-
pothesis. 
Of course, we can imagine the defender of the “ceteris paribus, nuts are lethal”-
hypothesis objecting as follows: “my law predicts y = –0.5 only for observations made 
under very specific conditions, and these will remain rare! Given that people will con-
tinue in their majority to survive eating nuts, I fully expect the error variance in my 
data to remain high in the future, and outliers (from my perspective) to remain en-
demic. The point is that this is  provided for by the cp-clause hedging my hypothesis! 
Don’t forget that the cp-clause in front of my law hedges not only the regularity it con-
tains, it obviously also hedges the predictions I am liable to make on its basis. There-
fore, your criterion of estimated predictive accuracy, which merely measures the differ-
ence between predicted value and observed value, does not apply to cp-laws, because it 
fails to capture the fact that my cp-clause will exclude most of the observed values from 
being taken into account in the first place.” 
In other words, she points out that the cp-clause hedging her “law” explicitly foresees 
and provides for large error variance, and that this fact is therefore not to be counted 
against her hypothesis.
Yet, this defence is ineffectual. The error term ‘σ2’ can be interpreted in more ways 
than one. True, its most common interpretation is that of representing measurement 
inaccuracies and other random interfering factors—the noise in the data. But ‘σ2’ is 
fundamentally just an epistemic term, which denotes all  unknown factors that, given our 
working hypothesis, appear to us as ‘error’, no matter how that appearance actually 
arises. Due to our necessarily limited epistemic situation, some sort of ‘error’ or other 
in this sense is unavoidable. We can quantify the kind of ‘error’ arising from the action 
of additional variables we do not know of in just the same way as we can treat the role 
of measurement inaccuracies or random noise. There is no need to assume that the 
value of ‘σ2’ is known beforehand, for it can be treated as just another adjustable pa-
rameter.
Summing up: AIC says that three factors, including error variance, must be weighed 
up against each other, and thus provides a quantifiable reason for avoiding hypotheses 
that, at no gain in simplicity, require us to interpret our evidence as packed with out-
liers. It is an interesting fact about many spurious cp-laws that the evidence for them is, 
just like in our nuts-example, indeed packed with outliers, and they hence have a large 
‘error’ variance. (e.g. “cp, turtles outrun hares”, etc.).9 Thus, we can now conclude that 
cp-laws are incomplete strict laws (condition 1), whose putative completers must not be 
sufficient on their own for the consequent of the law (condition 2); that they must pass 
a scientific vetting process, which we are expressing through the requirement that they 
occur in other scientific laws (conclusion 3); and that while a large number of the type 
of rogue cp-hypotheses that threaten cp-laws with vacuity are immediately ruled out by 
(3), some unacceptable completers satisfy this requirement, but they do not satisfy 
(condition 4), namely they do not simultaneously minimize error variance, complexity, 
and distance from the observational data. Hence, (4) gets rid of further counterexam-
ples. 
Objections
This brings me to the last section of this paper. A theory of cp-laws is a sport of exam-
ples and counter-examples, and any proposed account must be measured in its exten-
sional adequacy. Does it properly show how those hedged generalisations, which we 
accept as true, can be considered cp-laws, while explaining why those which we do not 
accept as true, cannot be so considered? To see whether the account tendered here 
does this job, I shall conclude by looking at a few more popular problem cases, as well 
as a very general objection to the completer-account. 
Objection (1): what if the we have a case of a true cp-generalisation, where the major-
ity of cases does not fit the law? Say, “ceteris paribus, sea turtles live long lives”? What is 
“normal” for the turtle, namely a long life, and what we would expect, ceteris paribus, 
is not what is statistically the case, because most turtles fall prey to predation within 
minutes of  hatching… 
Well, the first thing to note here is that the very point of cp-laws is that they are pre-
cisely not statistical laws (they are strict laws!). It is also worth bearing in mind that AIC 
equally is not about the statistical mean (it would make us choose Hypothesis 2 over 
Hypothesis 1 in Figure 4)
9 AIC which constraints our curve-fitting practices in other contexts via its simplicity criterion, reduces 
in the case of  the “curves” in Fig. 2 and 3 to the simple requirement to minimize error variance. To 
that extent, other theorems of  descriptive statistics might take its place. My primary interest here, to 
reiterate, is in the application of  curve-fitting norms to cp-laws, not in the question which one of  the 
alternative curve-fitting norms is to be preferred.
Figure 4
But the most pertinent reply to the objection is that like in the ‘cp, turtles overtake 
hares’ example, deciding whether a hedged generalisation is a valid cp-law always re-
quires a look at the scientific details of the case, and the nature of the postulated com-
pleters. Given that most early turtle deaths are caused by the action of predators within 
one hour of hatching, and given that the absence of predation plays a significant role 
in a whole panoply of other biological cp-laws (e.g. in population biology), absence of 
predation can be accepted as a legitimate completer of the cp-clause in ‘cp, turtles live 
long lives’. Thus, we can truthfully say that in the absence of predation, turtles live 
long lives.10
What about ‘predation’? Can we not equally take this as our completer, and claim that 
the fact that turtles live short lives in the presence of predators shows the truth of ‘cp, 
turtles live short lives’? Well, such a law with the corresponding completer ‘predation’ 
would fall out of a model according to which the turtle organism has a very short aver-
age life span even under conditions which are ideal for it. This despite the deeply para-
doxical consequence that every act of reproduction would in such a model amount to 
an ‘anomaly’... Were we to adopt such a model, our law would need to explain away 
every exceptional instance of a turtle older than 1h. But this doesn’t make biological 
sense. (I am close to Gerhard Schurz’s notion of ‘normic laws’ (cf. for example Schurz 
2002). A life span of 1h is not a trait for which turtle organisms could have been se-
lected, and therefore cases in which turtles exceed a life span of 1h do not  call for an 
explanation-every contrary case does however call for an explanation. So we shouldn’t 
accept predation as a completer in this case—survival until reproduction is what nature 
“intended”, and we should expect this to be reflected in our biological laws and their 
10 Naturally, ‘absence of  predation’ can only make up part of  our completer, here. Other “ideal” con-
ditions such as ‘health’, etc., would also be part of  the mix. For more on the actual completability of  
completers, see below. 
completers: it is the absence of predation, rather than its presence, which would consti-
tute “ideal” conditions for the survival and reproduction of a given turtle organism. 
Thus, I would not expect to find any nomological completers for the rogue law ‘cp, tur-
tles live short lives’. 
The same applies, mutatis mutandis, for a distinct class of objections based on a different 
class of counterexamples, which I have already treated above: the converse case in 
which the majority of cases do fit with what a generalisation predicts, and yet this is 
insufficient for the truth of  the corresponding cp-law. (the Supreme Court example).
Objection 2: “But is, quite independently of the availability of specific counterexam-
ples, the theory not clearly and self-evidently hopeless, because cp-laws are in principle 
incompletable?”
The completer-account, after all, might be accused of not seeing the forest for the 
trees, or of running down a blind alley… This is because for any interesting cp-
generalisation, a fully explicit description of the conditions under which the antece-
dent+completer nomically necessitates its consequent, would be unstateably long or 
perhaps even infinitely long. None of the proposed completers, it seems, are really 
completers as defined, namely (jointly) sufficient conditions for the consequent. No 
one, certainly no cognitively limited agent, can non-vacously specify the sufficient con-
ditions of  any interesting physical event, let alone the antecedent of  a law of  nature. 
Yet, this problem is of course old news in experimental science. The conditions a cp-
clause refers to are often unfathomably complex, yes, but we should not have expected 
anything else. Our best representation of what it is  to be ‘normal’, ‘equal’, or ‘ideal’ in 
the relevant senses will always be a heavily simplified and abstract model of the situa-
tion, which leaves out countless features. That’s after all exactly how science works: it 
constructs simple structured representations as substitute systems for investigating and 
understanding the real systems they model. Without simplified representations of what 
we wish to understand or to do, we could not understand or do anything. Although we 
can never hope to complete our cp-generalisations, this  circumstance alone does not 
stop them from fulfilling the other conditions on law-hood, and of playing the role of 
laws in science. 
Thus, I endorse the assessment of Lange 2002, here, that the degree of certainty af-
forded by our incomplete knowledge of completers will not necessarily be inferior to 
our certainty of other, supposedly better known facts. Indeed, the very idea of a fully 
explicit antecedent or of a fully determinate law-statement is a myth, as Lange shows. 
Lange provides, in my view, a conclusive argument for the view that whether a given 
law is fully explicit or ceteris paribus, when we have a newly discovered object the ques-
tion whether it is to be subsumed under that law will be equally acute in both circum-
stances, and will be decided in the same way. He points out, in particular, that in order 
to decide whether a newly discovered causal factor qualifies as interfering with normal 
(equal, ideal) conditions, there must be sufficient agreement within the discipline on the 
relevant respects of comparison, so that analogies with canonical examples supply 
‘compelling reasons’ for deciding whether or not the factor does qualify (Lange 2002, 
408-10). So we must always cash out the provisions of a given law, whether strict or ce-
teris paribus, on a case by case basis—a process ‘that should be considered “business as 
usual” rather than symptomatic of  a poisonous vagueness’ (ibid.; cf. also Lange 2000). 
Conclusion
A metaphysically conservative account of cp-laws in terms of completers is, contrary 
to the views of some, not hopeless. Simple, plausible conditions (1)-(3) in conjunction 
with straightforward curve-fitting criteria as provided by the Akaike Information Crite-
rion, yield an account of cp-laws as disguised strict laws. This account provides a dis-
tinction between spurious and genuine hedged regularities, which is necessary to make 
cp-laws “respectable”, and it also illustrates the fundamental difference between a ceteris 
paribus-law and a statistical law. The proposed theory deals successfully with popular 
putative problem cases, such as “turtles live long lives” or “Supreme Court Justices are 
male”. The fact that cp-laws are, by their very nature incompletable, and hence inde-
terminate, is contrary to initial appearances not a serious problem, insofar as (as Lange 
(2002)) has shown) the type of indeterminacy exhibited by cp-laws is not fundamentally 
different from that exhibited by strict laws. Thus, we have a straightforward and plau-
sibe account of cp-laws, which is essentially compatible with a simple Humean view of 
laws as regularities, and dispenses with the introduction of additional metaphysical en-
tities, such as dispositions, capacities, etc. Whatever the arguments for introduction of 
the latter entities into the discourse of science, they can draw no additional support 
from the alleged problem of  cp-laws. 
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